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1 We consolidated Terrell Davis’s appeal (No. 12-
1486) and Jamar Blackshear’s appeal (No. 12-1485) for 
briefing and argument purposes. Blackshear’s counsel 
addressed the suppression issue—which is common to 
both defendants—and Davis’s counsel addressed the evi-
dentiary issues. The parties filed two consecutively num-
bered joint appendices (“J.A.”). Davis and Blackshear 
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________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
Police arrested Terrell Davis after finding him in a 
Jeep with nearly a kilo of cocaine in the backseat. The 
arrest led to a conviction for possession with intent to 
distribute. As evidence that Davis recognized the cocaine 
in the Jeep, the government proved at trial that he had 
two prior convictions for possessing cocaine. Yet the 
government never proved that the cocaine from his past 
was similar in appearance, quantity, or form. We ac-
knowledge that some of our cases admitting prior crimi-
nal acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) have 
been expansive. But our expansiveness is finite, and this 
case crosses the line. We will vacate Davis’s conviction 
and remand. 
I 
The events at issue took place on a wintry after-
                                                                                              
also filed separate appendices to their opening briefs 
(“D.A.” and “B.A.”). 
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noon over two years ago. Two Philadelphia police offi-
cers were patrolling near 5100 Market Street—roughly 
four miles west of Independence Hall and the Liberty 
Bell. This is a dangerous part of the city where drug deals 
and robberies are commonplace. Officer Clifford Gilliam 
parked his patrol car, and Officer Shawn Witherspoon 
joined him on foot. On the opposite side of the street, the 
officers spotted a black Jeep Grand Cherokee, later de-
termined to be from Enterprise Rent-A-Car. Inside were 
two men, Terrell Davis and Jamar Blackshear. The Jeep’s 
engine was running but nothing seemed amiss. 
After a period of time, Davis and Blackshear be-
gan to act suspiciously. They reached toward each other 
with “body motions [that] were consistent with the ex-
changing of narcotics in a narcotics transaction.” B.A. 8.2
                                           
2 The officers did not explain how the “body mo-
tions” were inconsistent with lawful behavior, such as 
sharing a meal or exchanging gifts. 
 
The officers exited their patrol car and approached the 
Jeep. Upon noticing the officers, Davis and Blackshear 
had “expressions of shock on their faces,” B.A. 8, and 
they tossed something into the backseat. They exited the 
Jeep and quickly walked away—so quickly, in fact, that 
Blackshear did not bother closing his door. Officer 
Gilliam stopped Blackshear and patted him down to 
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search for weapons. He instead found a wad of cash in 
his pocket. In the meantime, Officer Witherspoon 
stopped Davis and patted him down. He found a similar 
amount of cash.  
Everything indicated to the officers that this was a 
drug deal: the suspicious movements, the hurried depar-
tures, the wads of cash, and the neighborhood itself. 
Knowing that guns often accompany drug deals, the of-
ficers decided to search the Jeep for weapons—and to see 
if there were any other occupants. Officer Witherspoon 
tried to look through the tinted rear window, but it was 
too dark. So he opened the already-ajar driver’s door and 
saw a handgun wedged between the driver’s seat and the 
middle console. At that point, the officers arrested Davis 
and Blackshear and placed them in the patrol car.  
The handgun was not the only item in the Jeep. Of-
ficer Witherspoon returned and spotted an opaque shop-
ping bag in the backseat. It was open and contained a 
white substance. The officers requested a drug-detection 
dog, which alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers 
obtained a warrant and recovered ten cell phones, a pair 
of binoculars, and two shopping bags with roughly 740 
grams of cocaine distributed among nine smaller Ziploc 
bags. The cocaine itself was compressed into the shape of 
a brick and had a street value over $75,000. 
Davis and Blackshear were charged with pos-
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sessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and with possessing a fire-
arm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c). They were also charged with aiding and 
abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2.  
Davis and Blackshear filed a motion to suppress all 
evidence from the Jeep. They argued that because the 
Jeep’s front driver’s side window was tinted, the officers 
could not have seen the alleged reaching, gawking, and 
tossing—and so they could not have had any cause for 
suspicion in the first place. The District Court inspected 
the Jeep and discovered that the window was in fact 
tinted. The Court nonetheless denied the suppression 
motion. It credited the testimony of the officers who said 
that the window had been tint-free on the day of the ar-
rests eight months earlier. It also credited the testimony 
of an Enterprise employee who said that neither Enter-
prise nor the manufacturer had tinted the windows and 
that since the arrests over fifty people had rented the 
Jeep. 
The defendants then pursued separate paths. 
Blackshear pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the 
denial of his suppression motion. He received two con-
secutive sixty-month sentences plus four years of super-
vised release. Davis opted for a jury trial. As the trial ap-
proached, the government asked permission to introduce 
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Davis’s two prior convictions for possessing cocaine. 
The District Court consented, stating that the convictions 
were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) 
to show that Davis recognized the drugs in the Jeep. At 
trial, the jury heard testimony from a range of witnesses, 
including Officers Gilliam and Witherspoon; Keith Fes-
tus, the owner of a nearby cell-phone store; and a nar-
cotics expert. The jury ultimately found Davis guilty of 
the drug crime but not guilty of the gun crime. He re-
ceived a seventy-eight-month sentence plus four years of 
supervised release. 
Davis raises four issues on appeal: the denial of his 
suppression motion, the admission of his prior convic-
tions, and two other evidentiary issues.3
II 
  
Davis’s first argument is that the officers illegally 
stopped him after he exited the Jeep. This would make 
the cocaine inadmissible as the product of an illegal sei-
zure. “Where a motion to suppress has been denied, we 
review the order for clear error as to the underlying facts, 
but exercise plenary review as to its legality in the light 
                                           
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have final-decision jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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of the court’s properly found facts.” United States v. 
Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation 
marks omitted). The District Court rejected Davis’s con-
stitutional argument, and with good reason.4
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The gen-
eral rule is that a search or seizure is unreasonable if the 
police lack either probable cause or a warrant—though 
courts have created several exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 
(2011) (noting that the ultimate touchstone is “reason-
ableness”). Over the past few decades, the Supreme 
Court has created a broad exception to both require-
ments: “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the 
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 
123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
This exception also allows officers to search the passen-
ger area of a vehicle without probable cause or a warrant 
 
                                           
4 Davis has standing to challenge the search of the 
Jeep—even though he was a mere passenger—because 
his seizure gave the officers a reasonable suspicion to 
search inside the Jeep. See United States v. Mosley, 454 
F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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if they conduct a lawful stop and reasonably believe that 
the suspect is dangerous and has a weapon inside. See 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983). 
Davis’s constitutional argument turns on whether 
the officers had a reasonable suspicion when they first 
stopped him. And that turns on whether the front driver’s 
side window was tinted at the time of the arrests—for if it 
was, the officers could not have seen through it, and they 
would have lacked any reason to suspect an illicit trans-
action. Though the District Court inspected the window 
at the suppression hearing and saw that it was tinted, the 
Court found that it was not tinted on the day of the arrests 
eight months earlier. 
That finding was not clearly erroneous. For one 
thing, Officers Gilliam and Witherspoon both testified 
that the front driver’s side window, unlike the rear win-
dow, was tint-free when they saw the Jeep. And an En-
terprise employee testified that neither Enterprise nor the 
manufacturer had tinted the window and that over fifty 
people had rented the car between the arrests and the 
hearing. He also said that another renter could have been 
responsible for the tint. “Anybody could have put it on.” 
J.A. 325. This testimony supports the District Court’s 
finding. To be sure, the police took a picture of the Jeep 
on the day of the arrests, and the front and rear windows 
appear to have the same tint. But the picture was taken at 
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night in low lighting. Davis also points to a witness who 
testified at the suppression hearing that the window 
“probably was a little tinted.” J.A. 385. But the District 
Court found that his testimony was not “particularly 
credible” for “a number of reasons.” B.A. 6 n.3. 
The record thus contains no evidence that plainly 
contradicts the officers’ testimony. And “when the dis-
trict court’s decision is based on testimony that is coher-
ent and plausible, not internally inconsistent and not 
contradicted by external evidence, there can almost never 
be a finding of clear error.” United States v. Igbonwa, 
120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997). As a result, the District 
Court did not clearly err when it found that the window 
was tint-free. 
Nor did the District Court err in concluding that 
the officers had a reasonable suspicion to stop Davis. The 
officers observed odd behavior through the front win-
dow—an exchange, shocked expressions, and tossing 
motions. Davis and Blackshear rapidly left the car and 
began walking away, the latter failing to close the car 
door. And the activity took place in a high-crime area. 
The officers thus had a reasonable suspicion that a crime 
might be afoot. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Wardlow, 528 
U.S. at 124 (recognizing presence in a “high crime area,” 
“unprovoked flight,” and “nervous, evasive behavior” as 
factors supporting a reasonable suspicion); see also 
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United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 
2004) (concluding that flight from a traffic stop creates a 
reasonable suspicion). 
The officers also had authority to search the Jeep. 
The pat downs revealed large wads of cash, suggesting 
that Davis and Blackshear were in the middle of a drug 
deal. Because drug dealers often carry guns, the officers 
had “a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable 
facts” that Davis and Blackshear were dangerous and 
might have weapons inside the Jeep. Long, 463 U.S. at 
1049 (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). That belief allowed the 
officers to search the Jeep for weapons. During the 
search, they found something else—cocaine in the 
backseat—but they “clearly cannot be required to ignore 
the contraband” discovered “while conducting a legiti-
mate Terry search of the interior of the automobile.” 
Long, 463 U.S. at 1050. For these reasons, we will affirm 
the denial of Davis’s suppression motion. 
III 
Davis’s second argument is that the District Court 
erred in admitting his two prior convictions for pos-
sessing cocaine. We review that decision for an abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (noting that a decision is an abuse of discre-
tion if “clearly contrary to reason and not justified by the 
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evidence” (quotation marks omitted)). Though we have 
held that some prior drug convictions are admissible un-
der Federal Rule of Evidence of 404(b), we have never 
held that a possession conviction is admissible to show 
knowledge or intent in a distribution trial. We decline to 
do so today. 
A 
American courts have long excluded evidence of a 
person’s prior bad acts. This tradition reflects a fear that 
the jury will place too much weight on past crimes and 
prior misdeeds. “[I]t is said to weigh too much with the 
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with 
a bad general record and deny [the accused] a fair op-
portunity to defend against a particular charge.” 
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948); 
see also H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to 
Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the 
Courtroom, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 884 (1982) (“[A]s 
the special conditions of predictive value coalesce, the 
potential for prejudice also rises.”). The risk is that jurors 
will focus on evidence of prior acts, believing that some-
one with a criminal record cannot change and discount-
ing any evidence to the contrary. 
Over the past two hundred years, the prior-acts 
rule has changed much in form but little in function. In 
the early days of the common law, courts used an inclu-
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sionary approach: evidence of prior acts was presump-
tively admissible unless it was relevant only to the de-
fendant’s propensity to commit a crime. See Julius Stone, 
The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: Amer-
ica, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 989–90 (1938). In the nine-
teenth century, the rule slowly became exclusionary: 
such evidence was presumptively inadmissible unless the 
proponent could show that it was relevant to one of sev-
eral specific purposes, such as motive or intent. See id. at 
990–93 (concluding that American courts applied this 
rule on the mistaken belief that the exclusionary ap-
proach was part of the English common law). But that 
trend faded, and courts began to use different ap-
proaches—some inclusionary, some exclusionary. See 
United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 765–66 (3d Cir. 
1978) (noting the division of authorities). The Federal 
Rules of Evidence settled the matter in 1975, establishing 
a uniform inclusionary approach. Id.; United States v. 
Green, 617 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2010). Yet this 
change, “like the nineteenth century switch from the in-
clusionary to the exclusionary approach, did not give rise 
to any significant change in the admissibility of such evi-
dence.” Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule 
Revisited, 1998 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547, 1560. 
The modern approach is set forth in Federal Rule 
of Evidence 404(b). “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or 
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character 
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in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(1). That principle seems strict, but prior-acts evi-
dence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of acci-
dent.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Uncontroversial at the 
time of adoption, Rule 404(b) has become the most cited 
evidentiary rule on appeal. See Thomas J. Reed, Admit-
ting the Accused’s Criminal History: The Trouble with 
Rule 404(b), 78 Temp. L. Rev. 201, 211 (2005). 
The text of Rule 404(b) has led to a four-part test. 
Prior-acts evidence is admissible only if it is (1) offered 
for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)(2); (2) relevant to 
that purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under the Rule 
403 balancing requirement; and (4) accompanied by a 
limiting instruction, if requested. See Green, 617 F.3d at 
249; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 
691–92 (1988) (discussing these four requirements).5
                                           
5 Rule 404(b) excludes only extrinsic evidence, or 
evidence of acts that are not the basis of the current pros-
ecution. It does not exclude intrinsic evidence, which ei-
ther “directly proves” or “facilitate[s]” the charged of-
fense. Green, 617 F.3d at 248–49 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 All 
 
15 
 
this really means is that such evidence must have a 
nonpropensity purpose and satisfy the same relevancy 
requirements as any other evidence. 
And yet the relevancy requirements pose problems 
of their own in this context. Indeed, the problems are in 
many cases insurmountable. See Uviller, 130 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. at 878 (“The test of ordinary relevance is often an 
insuperable barrier.”). For starters, the prior-acts evi-
dence must be relevant to a proper purpose, and it must 
be relevant in a way that avoids any propensity inference. 
See United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 (3d Cir. 
1992). Consider a defendant who has been convicted of 
manslaughter. In a later assault prosecution, the govern-
ment might want to use the conviction, perhaps to prove 
intent. But that use is off limits if the only reason the 
conviction is relevant to intent is the inference that be-
cause the defendant has committed manslaughter before, 
he must have committed assault now. See id. at 887–88. 
In addition, the conviction must be relevant based on 
what the factfinder knows about the prior act. So even if 
the defendant was convicted of intentional manslaughter, 
the conviction will be relevant to intent only if the jury 
knows the act was intentional and not reckless or negli-
gent. 
That is why the use of prior-acts evidence requires 
care from prosecutors and judges alike. In proffering 
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such evidence, the government must explain how it fits 
into a chain of inferences—a chain that connects the evi-
dence to a proper purpose, no link of which is a forbid-
den propensity inference. Id. at 887. And then the “dis-
trict court, if it admits the evidence, must in the first in-
stance, rather than the appellate court in retrospect, artic-
ulate reasons why the evidence also goes to show some-
thing other than character.” Id. at 888. The reasoning 
should be detailed and on the record; a mere recitation of 
the purposes in Rule 404(b)(2) is insufficient.6
B 
 Unfortu-
nately, these requirements are “so often honored in the 
breach” that they resonate “about as loudly as the prover-
bial tree that no one heard fall in the forest.” United 
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(McKee, J., dissenting).  
With these principles in mind, we conclude that 
Davis’s convictions for possessing cocaine were inad-
missible to prove knowledge or intent in his trial for pos-
                                           
6 We have affirmed even when a district court’s 
analysis was somewhat flimsy—but only when the gov-
ernment had already established a valid chain of infer-
ences. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 340 F.3d 169, 
173–74 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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sessing with intent to distribute. The District Court 
abused its discretion by admitting this evidence, and we 
will vacate Davis’s conviction. 
Davis was twice convicted of possessing cocaine 
under Pennsylvania law—once in 2007 and once in 2008. 
The government filed a motion to introduce these con-
victions, advancing a pentad of purposes. J.A. 18 (“This 
evidence is relevant to prove the defendant’s plan to, 
knowledge of, and intent to distribute and/or possess co-
caine, and absence of mistake or accident.”). To its 
credit, the able District Court admitted the convictions as 
relevant to a single purpose: “Clearly, evidence of his 
prior convictions for possession of crack cocaine makes 
it more likely than not that Davis knew that the white 
substance in the plastic bag on the back seat of the Jeep 
was cocaine.” D.A. 18. The government now argues on 
appeal that the evidence also was relevant to intent. See 
Appellee Br. at 45. 
Knowledge and intent are indeed proper purposes 
under the first part of our Rule 404(b) test. And “[t]here 
is no question that, given a proper purpose and reasoning, 
drug convictions are admissible in a trial where the de-
fendant is charged with a drug offense.” Sampson, 980 
F.2d at 887. We have held, for example, that evidence of 
past distribution is relevant to prove knowledge of the 
same or different drug in a later distribution trial. E.g., 
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Givan, 320 F.3d at 461 (“The evidence that Givan had 
been convicted of distribution of cocaine makes Givan’s 
knowledge of the presence of the heroin more probable 
than it would have been without the evidence.”); United 
States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 187 (3d Cir. 2002) (con-
sidering the defendant’s past cocaine-distribution acts as 
evidence that he was not “an ignorant ‘go-fer’”); cf. 
United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[E]vidence of Vega’s participation in a prior drug con-
spiracy is probative of his knowledge of, and relationship 
with a member of, a later drug conspiracy.”). And we 
have held that evidence of past distribution is relevant to 
prove intent to distribute in a later distribution trial. E.g., 
United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“Lee’s prior drug trafficking conviction was properly 
admitted as evidence that Lee intended to distribute any 
drugs in his possession.”); Givan, 320 F.3d at 461; 
Boone, 279 F.3d at 187. We have even held that evidence 
of past distribution is relevant to prove knowledge of a 
different drug in a later possession trial. United States v. 
Lopez, 340 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2003). But we have 
never held that a possession conviction is relevant to 
prove either knowledge or intent in a distribution trial, 
and rightly so. 
1. Knowledge.  Possession and distribution are dif-
ferent in ways that matter—something that both the Dis-
trict Court and the government failed to appreciate. As to 
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knowledge, one who possesses a drug might not recog-
nize the same drug when prepared for distribution. The 
packaging or quantity might be different, and objects in 
greater quantities often have an appearance or smell of 
their own. Take water, which is transparent by the drop 
but blue in the ocean, or powdered sugar, which is floury 
on a donut but dense in a bag. In this case, the jury knew 
only that Davis had been twice convicted of possessing 
cocaine. See Appellee Br. at 19 n.3. The jury knew 
nothing of the packaging or quantity that led to those 
convictions, so it could not have known whether Davis’s 
past helped him to recognize the nearly one kilogram of 
cocaine in the Jeep. 
Then there is the problem that the cocaine from 
Davis’s past might have been in a different form. Co-
caine is consumable either as a powder or as one of sev-
eral bases, most often crack. See DePierre v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2225, 2228–29 (2011). Neither form 
particularly resembles the other. As its name suggests, 
powder cocaine is a powder—specifically, a salt—that 
can be compressed or loose. See David A. Sklansky, Co-
caine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 
1283, 1290–91 (1995). On the other hand, crack cocaine 
is hard and waxy and often resembles small rocks or 
crystals. See id. This distinction matters, and the jury did 
not know which form Davis had possessed back in 2007 
and 2008. For all the jury knew, the cocaine could have 
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been a dash of powder on a golden tray. It could have 
been hidden in the lining of a suitcase. Or it could have 
been crack cocaine—in crystal form, in liquid form, 
rolled up in paper, or stuffed in a syringe. In any of those 
instances, Davis’s past would not have helped him to 
identify the compressed powder in the backseat. 
The two prior convictions thus fail the second part 
of our Rule 404(b) test, the relevancy requirement. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 401 (explaining that evidence is relevant if 
it is probative of a consequential fact). Based on the bare-
bones stipulation before it, the jury had no way of 
knowing whether Davis’s experiences made him any 
more likely to recognize the cocaine in the backseat. The 
convictions simply were not probative of Davis’s 
knowledge. See Givan, 320 F.3d at 466 (McKee, J., dis-
senting) (noting the difficulty when “there is absolutely 
nothing on this record that would allow the jury to make 
any meaningful or relevant comparison” between past 
and present drugs). At best, the convictions had such 
limited probative value that they fail the third part of our 
test, the balancing requirement. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 
(allowing courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 
. . . unfair prejudice.”). Either way, the convictions are 
inadmissible to prove Davis’s knowledge. 
The government nonetheless urges us to follow 
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Lopez and Givan. In Lopez, we held that the defendant’s 
participation in a cocaine-distribution conspiracy was 
admissible in a possession trial to prove knowledge of 
heroin, a different drug altogether. Lopez, 340 F.3d at 
174 (“[The conviction] was admissible for the purpose of 
rebutting the defendant’s anticipated claim of innocent 
association with, and lack of knowledge of, the heroin 
found near his bunk.”). And in Givan, we held that the 
defendant’s conviction for distributing cocaine was like-
wise admissible to prove knowledge and intent in a her-
oin-distribution trial. Givan, 320 F.3d at 461. These cases 
are at the outer bounds of admissibility under Rule 
404(b). See David Culberg, Note, The Accused’s Bad 
Character: Theory and Practice, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1343, 1358–59 & n.83 (2009) (criticizing Lopez and 
Givan). At all events, the two cases are distinguishable 
because the defendants had been convicted of dealing co-
caine, and drug dealers presumably have more 
knowledge of drugs in general. By contrast, a possession 
conviction does not imply a similar level of knowledge.  
2. Intent.  Nor does a possession conviction imply 
an intent to distribute. Possession and distribution are 
distinct acts—far more people use drugs than sell them—
and these acts have different purposes and risks. A prior 
conviction for possessing drugs by no means suggests 
that the defendant intends to distribute them in the future. 
“Acts related to the personal use of a controlled sub-
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stance are of a wholly different order than acts involving 
the distribution of a controlled substance. One activity 
involves the personal abuse of narcotics.” United States 
v. Ono, 918 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990). The other 
usually involves “the implementation of a commercial 
activity for profit.” Id. As a result of these differences, 
Davis’s convictions again fail the second part of our Rule 
404(b) test. 
In cases such as this, there is an ever-present dan-
ger that jurors will infer that the defendant’s character 
made him more likely to sell the drugs in his possession. 
But that is precisely the type of inference that Rule 
404(b) forbids. Any other conclusion would run the risk 
of unraveling the prior-acts rule: 
[I]f the act of possessing or using marijuana 
is to be admissible to prove intent to 
transport and sell marijuana, or, to go even 
further, to prove intent to transport and sell a 
different drug, then there is no reason why 
participation in any drug-related crime could 
not be used to prove intent to engage in any 
other drug-related crime, or why any rob-
bery could not be used to prove the requisite 
intent with respect to any other robbery. A 
rule allowing such evidence would eviscer-
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ate almost entirely the character evidence 
rule. 
David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore. A Treatise on Evi-
dence: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events 
§ 7.5.2(d); see also Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. 
Graham, Jr., 22A Federal Practice and Procedure: Evi-
dence § 5242 (2d ed. 2013) (“[T]he routine use of [the 
intent] exception [under Rule 404(b)] could easily de-
stroy the exclusionary rule.”).7
We join other circuits in declaring that a posses-
  
                                           
7 Some circuits require prior acts under Rule 
404(b) to “meet a threshold level of similarity in order to 
be admissible to prove intent” to commit the charged of-
fense. United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 661 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 
517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing cases in Second, Fifth, 
and Ninth Circuits for the idea that “[w]hen a prior 
criminal act is relied upon to prove intent or knowledge, 
similarity between the two events must be shown” (alter-
ation in original and quotation marks omitted)). We need 
not adopt that requirement in our Circuit or decide 
whether cocaine possession and distribution are suffi-
ciently similar. After all, a past intent to possess drugs 
simply is not probative of a future intent to distribute. 
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sion conviction is inadmissible to prove intent to distrib-
ute. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that “possession 
of a small quantity of crack cocaine for personal use on 
one occasion . . . sheds no light on whether [the defen-
dant] intended to distribute crack cocaine in his posses-
sion on another occasion nearly five months earlier.” 
United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 
2002). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have suggested 
likewise. See United States v. Santini, 656 F.3d 1075, 
1078 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that prior convictions “for 
simple possession” were “not similar to the importation 
of marijuana and thus lack[] probative value”); Ono, 918 
F.2d at 1465 (distinguishing between possession and dis-
tribution in dicta); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 
338, 344 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that evidence of the 
defendant’s prior marijuana possession was not probative 
of his intent to distribute cocaine); United States v. 
Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1979) (distin-
guishing between “personal use versus resale”); cf. 
Enriquez v. United States, 314 F.2d 703, 717 (9th Cir. 
1963) (concluding that a trial was unfair because the 
court had admitted evidence of marijuana possession to 
show intent to sell heroin). But see United States v. 
Walsh, 231 F.3d 366, 370-71 (7th Cir. 2000) (allowing 
the admission of a possession conviction in a distribution 
trial because the conviction involved “distribution 
amounts”). Other circuits have reached the opposite re-
sult, but we are not persuaded. See, e.g., United States v. 
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Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Logan, 121 F.3d 1172, 1178 (8th Cir. 1997); 
United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 
1993). We conclude that Davis’s convictions should not 
have been before the jury—not as evidence of 
knowledge, not as evidence of intent. 
And problems remain. The District Court also 
committed two instruction-related errors. First, it did not 
provide the requested limiting instruction at the time the 
evidence was admitted; it did so only in the final jury 
charge. Second, the Court concluded that the convictions 
were admissible to prove knowledge, but the jury charge 
included a wide list of purposes, allowing the jury to con-
sider the convictions as evidence of “state of mind, 
knowledge, or intent,” as well as absence of “accident or 
mistake.” J.A. 125–26; see Sampson, 980 F.2d at 889 
(“By simply repeating the entire litany of permissible 
theories under Rule 404(b), the judge’s instruction gave 
the jury inadequate guidance.”). While these errors are 
problematic, we would reverse even in their absence. No 
instruction could have eliminated the infirmity at the 
heart of this case: Davis’s convictions were inadmissible 
for any purpose.8
                                           
8 The government did not argue the issue of harm-
less error in its brief. Such silence usually means that 
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IV 
Davis’s two remaining arguments are mere make-
weight. The first is that the District Court improperly 
admitted a statement from the government’s expert wit-
ness. The second is that the Court improperly refused to 
admit a witness’s prior statement. We review these deci-
sions for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. 
Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the 
abuse-of-discretion standard to a decision about the ad-
missibility of expert testimony); United States v. Frazier, 
469 F.3d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying the same stand-
ard to a decision about the admissibility of a prior con-
                                                                                              
harmless error is waived, but we may still consider the 
issue depending on “the length and complexity of the 
record, whether the harmlessness of the error or errors 
found is certain or debatable, and whether a reversal will 
result in protracted, costly, and ultimately futile pro-
ceedings in the district court.” United States v. 
McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 
United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 
1991)). Here, we refuse to do so because we see no rea-
son “that a reversal will [ ] lead to drawn out proceed-
ings,” and we do not “know with sufficient certainty that 
the error was harmless.” United States v. Faulks, 201 
F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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sistent statement). 
Davis argues that the government’s narcotics ex-
pert, Kenneth Bellis, violated Federal Rule of Evidence 
704(b). This Rule bars experts from testifying that the 
defendant had the necessary state of mind to commit a 
crime—whether it be intent, knowledge, or something 
else.9
Government: One further question. If you 
had that level of cocaine, if you 
 Yet the Rule does not bar experts from testifying 
about the practices of those in the drug trade. United 
States v. Watson, 260 F.3d 301, 308 (3d Cir. 2001). In 
fact, such testimony is admissible even if it supports a 
conclusion that the defendant had the necessary state of 
mind. United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d 
Cir. 1998). The only limitation is that the expert may not 
draw the ultimate conclusion for the jury or testify in 
such a way that the ultimate conclusion is inevitable. Id. 
Davis objects to the following statement from 
Bellis: 
                                           
9 Rule 704(b) states, “[i]n a criminal case, an ex-
pert witness must not state an opinion about whether the 
defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition 
that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a 
defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” 
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were a distributor, 740 grams—
if you were upper level distrib-
utor with 740 grams of cocaine, 
is it common that you would 
have persons present? 
Davis’s attorney:  Objection. 
The Court:  Objection overruled. 
Government:  Is it common that you would 
have persons in the presence of 
that cocaine who did not have a 
connection to that cocaine? 
Davis’s attorney:  Objection. 
The Court:  Overruled. 
Bellis:  Not in my opinion, no. 
J.A. 50–51. According to Davis, these questions elicited 
Bellis’s opinion on whether Davis intended to distribute 
the cocaine in the backseat.  
The major flaw in this argument is that Bellis 
merely spoke about common practices. He did not in any 
way connect those practices to Davis. This means that 
Bellis did not draw the ultimate conclusion for the jury, 
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nor did the conclusion inevitably follow from his testi-
mony. United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 
2006) (allowing an expert to say “that in his opinion . . . 
drug dealers are very likely to carry guns, and drug buy-
ers almost never do” because the expert “said not a word 
about [the defendant’s] mental state” but rather spoke 
about “common practices”). Davis’s Rule 704(b) argu-
ment is meritless. 
The same is true of his final argument. Davis as-
serts that the District Court improperly refused to admit a 
prior statement from Festus. The statement called into 
question the police officers’ accounts, but the Court con-
cluded that it was inadmissible hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 
802. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) defines a 
statement as nonhearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies and is 
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and 
the statement . . . is consistent with the declarant’s testi-
mony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a 
recent improper influence or motive in so testifying.” 
Festus’s various accounts are inconsistent at best. 
A few months after the arrests, he told Blackshear’s at-
torney in a written statement that the patrol car pulled up 
behind the Jeep with its lights flashing. Two months 
later, Festus testified in the suppression hearing that the 
lights were not flashing. At trial, he returned to his for-
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mer statement that the lights were flashing.10
As required by Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Festus was 
subject to cross-examination and his prior statement—at 
least the one he gave to Blackshear’s attorney—was con-
sistent with his trial testimony. But Davis runs into 
problems with the requirement that the statement “rebut 
an express or implied charge that the declarant recently 
fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The government never so 
much as suggested that Festus’s trial narrative was a re-
cent fabrication. It merely pointed out the inconsistency 
between his suppression testimony and his trial testi-
mony. Inconsistency alone is not a charge of recent fabri-
cation; we also require a suggestion of “conscious altera-
tion.” Frazier, 469 F.3d at 89 (“The line between chal-
 The govern-
ment impeached Festus’s trial testimony by introducing 
his inconsistent suppression testimony. On redirect, Da-
vis referred Festus to his written statement to Black-
shear’s attorney. See Fed. R. Evid. 612. Davis also asked 
the District Court to admit Festus’s written statement as a 
prior consistent statement. The Court denied that request. 
                                           
10 Whether the lights were flashing is not relevant 
to the crimes or the Fourth Amendment analysis. Yet this 
dispute had the potential to call into question the officers’ 
testimonies. 
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lenging credibility or memory and alleging conscious al-
teration can be drawn when a district court determines 
whether the cross-examiner’s questions reasonably imply 
intent on the part of the witness to fabricate.”); see also 
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157 (1995). Absent 
that suggestion, Davis’s final argument must fail. 
* * * 
The District Court correctly denied Davis’s sup-
pression motion. We cannot say the same about its deci-
sion to admit Davis’s possession convictions, which were 
inadmissible to prove knowledge or intent in a trial for 
possession with intent to distribute. We will vacate Da-
vis’s conviction and remand to the District Court. 
